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REFLECTIONS ON THE AFTERMATH OF ELECTION 2016 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS* 
“Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.” Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (Warren, C.J.) 
 
“Except when they don’t.” Me, Constitution Day 2016. 
 
Like many participants in the Schmooze, I have spent no small amount 
of time, and experienced no small amount of anxiety, attempting to unravel 
what happened in this past presidential election.  On September 15, 2016, 
between the primary season and the general election, the University of Mary- 
land Carey School of Law held its annual Constitution Day program, titled 
“Election 2016 and the Structural Constitution,”1 in which I both moderated 
and participated. 
I argued that we appeared to be in the midst of a dimensional shift in 
which the Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders campaigns had captured an out-
sider-versus-insider populist wave, one that upended traditional ideological 
suppositions, typically characterized in right-left ideological terms.  I ex-
plained that the left-right binary was a feature of our system’s direct election 
of head of state, one that produced a pure Nash equilibrium2 of two dominant 
parties.  I also explained why the two-party system is almost certain to re-
main, but I contended that in response to what we were observing, the parties’ 
compositions over time were likely to take different forms.  I envisioned that 
at least for a time, one party would comprise the populist wave, and the other 
would broaden its ideological umbrella to include crossovers who suffi-
ciently valued decent, functional, and competent governance even at the ex-
pense of some voters’ conventional ideological priors.  In support, I looked 
to the wide primary condemnation of Trump among members of his own 
                                                          
© 2017 Maxwell L. Stearns. 
* Venable, Baetjer & Howard Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty 
Development, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  The author thanks Sue McCarty for 
her always outstanding work. 
 1.  Maxwell L. Stearns et al., Constitution Day Lectures, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1 (2016), 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=endnotes. 
 2.  MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 170 (2009) (In the prisoner’s dilemma game, a “Nash equilibrium is the 
outcome or set of outcomes that follow from each player’s rational strategy in the absence of coor-
dination with the other player or specific information concerning the other player’s strategy, and in 
which no player has an incentive to deviate given the other player’s strategy.”). 
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party, including former Republican presidents, and policy positions that ap-
peared to thwart conventional right-left base positions. 
My excellent colleagues and co-panelists, Professor Larry Gibson, Pro-
fessor Paula Monopoli, and Professor Robert Koulish, were largely unper-
suaded.  Professor Gibson predicted that despite whoever won, we would re-
tain the same basic structure with the same two parties, Democratic and 
Republican.  To be clear, he and I agreed on the ultimate number of parties, 
and my thesis did not depend on their formal renaming.  Pointing to other 
historical campaigns—Goldwater, Wallace, and Reagan—Professor Gibson 
disputed my characterization of Election 2016 as different in kind. 
Professor Paula Monopoli forewarned of a possible, perhaps likely, Hil-
lary Clinton defeat despite convincing contrary polls, making her claim all 
the more impressive.  She rested her predicted contrary outcome, in part, on 
the agentic, or masculine-enforcing attributes of our unitary executive struc-
ture and how the presidency is widely characterized.3  She too was skeptical 
of my claim that this election was different in kind or that it portended some 
meaningful structural realignment. 
And Professor Robert Koulish, who was the closest to my position, as-
cribed the state of the election to what he termed the “Lizard Brain.”4  He 
focused on the often coarse language of the election, and passionately dis-
cussed his students’ (primarily undergraduates at the University of Maryland, 
College Park) disinclination even to discuss it for fear of learning what their 
classmates might actually think. 
WHO WAS RIGHT? 
Some might conclude that history has proven my dissenting colleagues 
correct: We still have our two-party system, although as I mentioned, I antic-
ipated that and did not predict an immediate seismic shift.  And yet, I will 
concede that even many Republicans who condemned, or simply avoided, 
endorsing Trump in the primary cycle have since rallied, or at least acqui-
esced, on his behalf.5  Hillary Clinton, of course, not only lost, while securing 
                                                          
 3.  Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the Structural Constitution, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 
17, 18–19 (2016) (describing the traits of Alexander Hamilton’s “ideal executive” as having attrib-
utes that are considered stereotypically masculine, making women “less likely to be seen as congru-
ent with an executive who possesses full plenary power to act unilaterally, as both head of state and 
government, and with the warrior function associated with the commander-in-chief role”). 
 4.  Robert Koulish, The Implications of a Lizard Election, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 24, 25, 
31 (2016) describing his “thesis that the 2016 campaign is atypical for its irrational, reptilian, or 
lizard . . .  characteristics” and that “political campaigns now possess the capacity to tap into the 
lizard brain” of voters). 
 5.  Russell Berman, Republicans Rush to Support Trump, ATLANTIC (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/top-republicans-lend-trump-crucial-sup-
port/526122/  
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three million more votes than Trump6—demonstrating that along with legis-
lators, presidents too sometimes represent acres and trees, not people—she 
did so against the ultimate alpha-male candidate, one whose crudeness and 
misogyny would have done in any other candidate.  And I will leave to you 
all to consider the implications of what has transpired for our collective 
amygdala. 
A dimensional shift certainly has the potential to correspond to what one 
might call “Democracy in Crisis,” and thus the subject of the Schmooze.  
When the dimension that we long assumed to define our politics no longer 
does so, the result can evoke a crisis.  Up seems down, and down seems up, 
a characterization that many have used to describe our present political cli-
mate.  And personally, I continue to believe that we are experiencing a di-
mensional shift, one that indeed does correspond to a constitutional crisis.7  
For those who disagree, what follows may be beside the point since my com-
ments build on, rather than defend, that premise.  One difficulty in thinking 
about a dimensional shift is the challenge of anticipating what the new fram-
ing might look like.  By way of analogy to Malcolm Gladwell’s The Tipping 
Point,8 it is hard to know you are in one until it is past tense, meaning the 
tipping has already happened. 
The factors that I am going to describe might be causal, or they might 
merely be correlative.  Sorting correlation and causation is a particular chal-
lenge, but even identifying correlative factors can be helpful since they might 
lead us eventually to a root cause.  I will focus on three factors that I believe 
are important and that are interconnected in perhaps nonobvious ways.  I be-
lieve that the following factors are undermining our constitutional democ-
racy: (1) an increasingly bimodal voter distribution that has a de minimis 
crossover voting cohort focused on competence and good governance; (2) an 
increase in the fractionalization of media sourcing, largely, but not exclu-
sively, attributable to the rise of the Internet; and (3) an ongoing and largely 
                                                          
 6.  FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 2, 
6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf (last visited September 17, 
2017). 
 7.  Since the Schmooze, I have published several posts on this theme on my blog, Blindspot. 
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The False Inevitability of Donald Trump, BLINDSPOT (August 15, 2017), 
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/08/15/The-False-Inevitability-of-Donald-Trump 
(discrediting alternative dimensionality account based on misreading of data respecting Trump elec-
tion and explaining why, properly understood, the data better support my original dimensionality 
thesis); Maxwell L. Stearns, Ideological Blindspots (part IV): The Dimensionality of Trumpism, 
BLINDSPOT (April 14, 2017), https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/04/14/Ideological-
Blindspots-part-IV-The-Dimensionality-of-Trumpism (providing further analytical foundation for 
my original dimensionality thesis).  
 8.  MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE 7 (2002). 
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unsuccessful struggle to superimpose onto our structural constitutional sys-
tem features that can be more easily accomplished within a parliamentary 
democracy, as opposed to our geographical, district-based structure, coupled 
with the direct election of the President as our head of state.9  I believe that 
these three factors have generated a problematical feedback loop and that we 
are now experiencing the fallout. 
I will now try to explain these relationships.  My main thesis is this: our 
constitutional democracy rests on premises that no longer hold, and it is in-
creasingly obvious to this observer that the conventional stories that those of 
us who teach constitutional law often tell our students about our constitu-
tional exceptionalism associated with structural resilience and adaptability 
are increasingly Pollyannaish—and perhaps downright false. 
Our constitutional structure operates on several premises, of which two 
are particularly important.  First, the system embeds the premise of direct, 
albeit filtered (through the Electoral College), selection of the president.  Sec-
ond, it assumes that a critical normative component of the coalition structure 
for nearly all elections, not just for the president, is necessarily geograph-
ically determined.  The first premise continues to hold; the second has been 
under considerable strain, and the combination is deeply problematic. 
Start with the breakdown of geographical determinism, first at a micro-
level, and then at a macro-level.  For most of us in the room, setting aside any 
local family, religious institutions to which we belong, professional associa-
tions, and schools, we are apt to form part of broader social networks more 
distant in physical space.  At a macro-level, it is a common insight that the 
East and West Coasts, plus major non-coastal cities, have more in common 
with each other than with the great red center.  More simply put, today’s 
communities of interest are rarely, or at least less commonly, geographically 
determined. 
It would be an interesting natural experiment to map degrees of Face-
book friendship, for example using incidents of correspondence, or even 
“likes,” based on geographical location.  I would be surprised if the experi-
ment did not reveal that once we account for the categories listed above, most 
density pairings correlating frequency of interaction are geographically re-
mote, typically including friends from college or graduate school, or other 
                                                          
 9.  Here I focus on two features of what I term our Structural Constitution: (1) direct election 
of head of state, and (2) geographically districted representation.  There are two other features that 
would require further exposition in a complete analysis: (1) the problematic relationship between 
formal separation of powers and the influence of parties in driving our political branches and in 
affecting the relationships among all three branches; and (2) the value of temporal stability that a 
system failing to anticipate no-confidence votes (short of impeachment) brings.  I will touch on the 
second of these in my conclusion.  For a thoughtful exploration of the implications of political 
parties for separation of powers, see Darryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). 
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loved ones, who live elsewhere.  This is partly due to the increasing geo-
graphical fluidity of elites.  But even among those who lack resources for 
such higher education access, communities of interest have become increas-
ingly dispersed as a result of the now stunningly low cost of technology, al-
lowing such communities to form in virtual space based on education, avo-
cation, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and yes, ideology.10 
Now consider common state gerrymandering practices that place com-
munities together in contiguous, but bug-splatter-like districts, as the North 
Carolina Twelfth District was described in Shaw v. Reno,11 or the slightly less 
bizarre (at least not sufficiently bizarre as to be explainable only due to race), 
yet still oddly shaped district described in Miller v. Johnson.12  These districts 
effectively forge what should be non-contiguous communities of interest, 
held together by the conceit that geography holds continuing normative rele-
vance.  This is a bit like the antiquated Golden Age of Hollywood Hays Code 
demanding women on screen keep one foot on the ground, thus avoiding ris-
qué scenes,13 at least for the unimaginative.  Both the Hays Code and physical 
geography in redistricting have produced results reminiscent of the Milton 
Bradley game “Twister”; namely, forced contortions flowing from compli-
ance with arbitrary “rules of the game.” 
We have similar rules in school districting, and yet, non-contiguity 
arises in practice through magnet schools, busing, and other practices that 
draw in students of interest (or their parents) from non-contiguous commu-
nities.  Vote districting has been more stubbornly resistant, and the conse-
quence has been district mapping that led Justice Stevens (borrowing from 
Pamela Karlan) famously to observe that in a sea of such districts, one form-
ing a coherent shape would ironically appear bizarre.14 
“Bizarre” districts15 are a feature of the misfit of non-geographical com-
munities of interest, and perhaps interest groups (in the public choice sense), 
forced to remain superimposed on a system that rigidly insists on geography 
                                                          
 10.  See, e.g., Drew Hendricks, Are Interest-Based Networks the Way of the Future?, FORBES 
(Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/drewhendricks/2014/10/16/are-interest-based-net-
works-the-way-of-the-future/#6a613d29643f.  
 11.  509 U.S. 630, 635–36 (1993). 
 12.  515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995). 
 13.  Useful Notes, The Hays Code, TV TROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Use-
fulNotes/TheHaysCode?from=Main.HaysCode (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) (“It was necessary in all 
romantic scenes for a woman to have at least one foot on the floor, to prevent love scenes in bed.  
This led to Foot Popping becoming popular.”). 
 14.  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1036 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The great irony, of 
course, is that by requiring the State to place the majority-minority district in a particular place and 
with a particular shape, the district may stand out as a stark, placid island in a sea of oddly shaped 
majority-white neighbors.” (citing Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights 
in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 287, 309 (1996)). 
 15.  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993). 
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as the basis for formal electoral legitimacy.  But this is certainly not inevita-
ble.  Within a parliamentary list-based system, there is no need for bizarrely 
shaped districts because there is no need for districts at all.  Voters who share 
common party preferences, like distant Facebook friends, can reside in non-
contiguous communities, and we can tally the per-party candidate votes and 
allocate assembly seats accordingly.  We simply go as far down the party list 
as needed to reflect the outcome.  In effect, gerrymandering is our way of 
imperfectly accomplishing this fairly simple parliamentary objective in a sys-
tem demanding formal geographical justification. 
Now consider how this relates to our direct election of head of state.  
Within a parliamentary system, there is a market for third parties; within ours, 
the pure Nash equilibrium is two dominant parties, each bonding some ideo-
logical distance apart at the coalition-forming—primary or caucus—stage, 
then merging somewhat inward in the general-election stage, after the essen-
tial coalitions have formed.  By contrast within parliamentary list systems, 
coalitions largely form post-election, as there remains a market for those who 
would form a critical part of the eventual governing coalition.  With direct 
election, the dimensional shift will still support two major parties—however 
named—in the long term, but the composition of the parties will change over 
time. 
This also relates to the observation concerning news media sourcing.  
Although I have not assessed this comprehensively, here is my intuition: I 
believe that the number of major newspapers in major cities is endogenous 
to the manner of selection of the head of state.  Traditionally, major U.S. 
cities had two main papers, for example, the New York Times and New York 
Post; the Washington Post and Washington Times; the Boston Globe and Bos-
ton Herald, one generally catering to elites, and typically somewhat left of 
center; the other catering to the working class and generally right of center.  
But compare, for example, London or Tel Aviv, where there is a generally 
larger assortment of papers, each catering to a somewhat smaller segment of 
the voting electorate with a more sectoral (or non-binary) approach to ideol-
ogy, one that might also implicate more than a single normative dimension.16  
This is less surprising when you consider the persistence of smaller parties 
who sometimes are in, and other times out, of governing coalitions. 
In the period of our history when this was descriptive, it was generally 
the case that these major sources included some crossover “voice,” commen-
tary from the other side as a means of enhancing legitimacy.  And not long 
                                                          
 16.  See, e.g., The Daily Mail; The Daily Telegraph; London Evening Standard; The Morning 
Chronicle (London); Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post, Ha’ir (Tel Aviv).  Consider also, in Israel, for 
example, Hamodia and Yated Ne’eman, two newspapers that cater to the Heradim, who form parties 
that have historically joined governing Labor-led or Likkud-led governing coalitions as the price of 
ensuring religious exemptions from military service. 
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ago, educated persons, whether liberal or conservative, read one or more ma-
jor news sources, such as a newspaper and weekly magazine—Time, 
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report (when its central mission was 
other than to torture legal academics).  In doing so, we all gained exposure to 
the “other side” of the ideological spectrum with which we typically associ-
ated.  This norm has now broken down largely as a result of the rise of social 
media, the ability to publish at zero marginal cost, and the choice among mil-
lennials to get their “news” from nontraditional, and more entertaining, 
sources.  The result is information silos, and information that is bias-confirm-
ing, rather than bias-challenging.17 
The biasing problem also coincides with a concern for veracity.  When 
those of us who regularly read newspapers came of age, we developed in-
stincts for recognizing a fake story as compared to a properly vetted one.  My 
strong hunch is that those roughly under the age of twenty-five or so are gen-
erally less able to successfully perform the gut-check test on actual fake news 
than those who are older and who grew up reading print and properly sourced 
media.  This is a skill, not a trait with which one is born.  A consequence is 
that this younger generation not only receives a higher incidence of bias-con-
firming news in general, but also that it is less able to distinguish bias-con-
firming fake news from bias-challenging real news.  I increasingly believe 
that millennials themselves often believe the “alternative facts”18 they em-
brace, and I do not ascribe this exclusively to either side, right or left. 
Return to the direct selection of head of state.  We know that our elec-
torate is bimodal. (Think here of the difference between a dromedary (one 
hump) and a camel (two humps)).  The reality is that we have generally had 
some degree of bimodalism, but there has always been substantial occupied 
space between the humps.  These crossover voters are fundamental to a sys-
tem with direct election of a head of state, as they have the special capacity 
to make choices that ensure that our system functions properly and electoral 
disaster is averted.  Parliamentary systems instead rely on internal checks for 
this through post-election coalition formation in which political elites make 
the ultimate selection, also with the benign effect, often, of averting disaster. 
Our model works better when the relative size of the crossover voter 
cohort is greater.  The breakdown of traditional news sourcing, though, has 
caused the opposite phenomenon: an increase in both bimodalism and the 
distance between the modes. Historically, the distancing between modes was 
                                                          
 17.  See, e.g., Walter Quattrociocchi, Antonio Scala & Cass R. Sunstein, Echo Chambers on 
Facebook 1–2 (June 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers2.cfm?abstract_id=2795110. 
 18.  Meet the Press, Conway: Press Secretary Gave “Alternate Facts,” NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/conway-press-secretary-gave-alternative-
facts-860142147643.  
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never complete, or at least as complete as it appeared to be in the 2016 elec-
tion. 
I contend that the confirmation-biasing tendencies of the breakdown of 
traditional media, and the increasing non-geographical-based communities of 
interest, have combined with our peculiar direct election system to create a 
breakdown of the protections needed for the system to function effectively.  
The fundamental problem is that we have no viable space left for crossover 
good-governance voters to go, forcing an extreme binary choice dominated 
by those lacking a deeper understanding of how our system was designed to 
work. 
CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave me?  Conflicted.  One might say that although 
Trump won, he won by negative three million votes.  And although true that 
he was elected based on prevailing rules, and that he claims he would have 
won by more votes had the rules been otherwise, thereby securing the man-
date he nonetheless dubiously claims, there is good reason to doubt him.  Per-
sonally, I think he hit his maximum for the simple reason that his supporters, 
unlike Hillary Clinton’s, were genuinely motivated voters.  If that is right, 
then the 2016 election might be a quirk, and the system could right itself.  I 
will concede that, even for me, this seems Pollyannaish. 
Instead, I think that the more plausible read is that we are in a place that 
is hard, maybe not possible, to extricate ourselves from, at least without fun-
damental constitutional structural reform.  This is my twenty-fifth year teach-
ing constitutional law.  I was an optimist for most of that time.  I no longer 
am.  I bought into the notion of constitutional adaptability, and for me this 
informed my sideways glance at constitutional scholars who, in my view, 
rigidly insisted upon original meaning or strict textualism, clubs that I could 
never join.  My scholarly project on the constitutional law side has long been 
to construct patterned stories from cases, standing, the Commerce Clause, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, and most recently, tiers of scrutiny.  I viewed 
the emerging doctrinal corpus as a kind of legitimating constitutional com-
mon law process, one that informed the adaptability of the overall constitu-
tional system itself.  The system, including the system of precedent, seemed 
far more important to me personally than the technical textual details or strict 
claims to contemporaneous historical meaning.  I bought into the premise that 
to the extent those details mattered, it was in constructing a functional system, 
one capable of enduring for an extended period of time.  Even on that reading, 
however, some premises are foundationally hard wired and cannot be altered 
within the framework of the existing Constitution.  That, after all, was the 
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real lesson of the Articles of Confederation, explaining why it had to be for-
mally abandoned, not amended, to be changed.19 
One might read this to imply that a parliamentary democracy is a pana-
cea.  It is not.  Once more celebrating his recent passing at the ripe age of 
ninety-five, we need go no further than Kenneth Arrow’s Impossibility The-
orem20 to recognize that no voting system is perfect; all have profound, or at 
least potentially profound, flaws.  And if we have learned nothing else, we 
have learned that, potentially profound flaws become actually profound flaws 
if you give them long enough.  One risk in a parliamentary system is the 
inability to forecast the end of the governing coalition.  No-confidence votes 
encourage a lack of stability as compared with our presidential election sys-
tem, and impeachment, invoked only twice thus far, has yet to result in re-
moval.  As the sole superpower in the world, the United States might be 
viewed as providing a public good of sorts in bonding itself to stable, pre-
dictable regimes and regime change.  But this is only beneficial to the extent 
that our system operates properly.  I am increasingly skeptical of that claim.  
I do not claim to have an answer as to how to fix it, and as I said, my goal 
here is to find correlations and possibly the root cause of our dysfunction. 
Our Constitution is the second oldest operating constitution in the world.  
It had a pretty good run.  It might be time to give it a rest and try something 
new.  Depending on how things play out going forward, I might even find 
myself ironically quoting someone who once famously asked: “What have 
you got to lose?”21 
                                                          
 19.  Jack Rakove, The Legacy of the Articles of Confederation, PUBLIUS, Fall 1982, at 45. 
 20.  KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
 21.  Tom LoBianco & Ashley Killough, Trump Pitches Black Voters: “What the Hell Do You 
Have to Lose?,” CNN (Aug. 19, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/19/politics/donald-
trump-african-american-voters/index.html.  
